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THE CHALLENGE OF FIDUCIARY
REGULATION: THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS
ACT AFTER SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS
Roberta S. Karmel*
ABSTRACT
Seventy-five years after its enactment the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940 has advanced from a relatively weak statute merely registering
advisers with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to a more
robust law imposing fiduciary responsibilities on advisers. Over the years,
the number of investment advisers and the number of their clients have
increased greatly. The SEC therefore has been pressured by Congress to
develop a harmonized fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and advisers
and also to develop and enforce a greater degree of oversight over the
advisory industry. These developments have raised the questions of how to
fund such efforts and whether advisers should organize a self-regulatory
organization. In the meantime, the Department of Labor adopted a
fiduciary standard that will impact many broker-dealers and investment
advisers. Further, the SEC has beefed up its examinations program for
advisers and has become more aggressive in its enforcement of cases
against advisers.
INTRODUCTION
When I was invited to submit an article for an issue of the Brooklyn
Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law celebrating its tenth
anniversary, I decided it was appropriate to write about the seventy-fifth
anniversary of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act),1 with
best wishes to the Journal and hopes it will one day reach its seventy-fifth
birthday. I was proudly present at the inauguration of this journal, but not
the enactment of the Advisers Act, as I was only three years old on August
22, 1940 when it was passed. There were no headlines about the Advisers
Act on that day, at a time when the country was considering entering World
* Roberta S. Karmel is Centennial Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Dennis J.
Block Center for the Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn Law School. Portions
of this Article were previously published in columns by the author in the New York Law
Journal. See Roberta S. Karmel, Oversight and Studies of Investment Advisers, N.Y. L.J.,
Feb. 17, 2011, at 3; Roberta S. Karmel, A Harmonized Fiduciary Duty for Advisers and
Broker-Dealers, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 21, 2011, at 3; Roberta S. Karmel, Should There Be an SRO
for Investment Advisers?, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 2011, at 3; Roberta S. Karmel, The Seventy-
Fifth Anniversary of the Investment Advisers Act, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 20, 2015, at 3. The author
appreciates the research assistance of Brooklyn Law School student, Andrew Fleming.
1. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–88b-21 (2012)).
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War II. Rather, the news reported a British coastal convoy that came under
fire from German cross-channel guns for the first time and a secret U.S.
government scheme to send warships to Great Britain.2 Also featured was a
story about the murder of Leon Trotsky.3
As the last of the New Deal securities laws that date between 1933 and
1940,4 the Advisers Act was probably the least considered and the least
important. It was a weak statute, which accomplished little more than
creating a registration list of investment advisers. Yet, over the years, it has
been repeatedly amended at the urging of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and has become a more viable regulatory framework
for investment advisers. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)5 expanded the coverage of the
Advisers Act to require hedge funds and private equity funds to register
with the SEC. Part I of this Article will set forth the legislative history of
the Advisers Act and its amendments. This Part will also cover the changed
population of investment managers, and suggest that investment
management regulation has become an increasingly important public policy
issue since 1940 due to the increase in retail investors as clients of advisers,
and the growth of individual retirement accounts (IRAs). Although the
Advisers Act has become a more robust regulatory tool, the challenges of
fiduciary regulation have become more difficult.
The changed population of investment advisers’ clientele has led to
serious controversies as to whether the SEC should pass a harmonized
fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and investment advisers, especially in
view of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) regulation setting forth a
fiduciary standard for accounts subject to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).6 It is unlikely that either of these
controversies will be resolved by the time this Article is published. Part II
of the Article will describe the status of these fiduciary rules, and express
my view that a principles-based fiduciary standard is preferable to rules-
2. British Warned to Keep Alert for Real Blitz: Whole Town Shaken by Torpedo Blast, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 22, 1940, at 1.
3. Quiz American Girl About Slayer as He Confesses, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 1940, at 1.
4. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a–77aa (2012)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012)); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-253,
53 Stat. 1149 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa–77bbbb (2012)); Investment Company
Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–80a-64
(2012)).
5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15
U.S.C.).
6. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment
Adviser, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,945 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550);
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1191c, 1201–1242, 1301–1461 (2012)).
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based regulation, but a self-regulatory organization (SRO) for investment
advisers might be necessary to administer such a standard.
As frequently occurs when the SEC is unable to engage in rulemaking,
it has attempted to impose its views concerning proper conduct upon
investment managers through enforcement actions. Part III will discuss
recent SEC enforcement activity in this area. Some recent enforcement
cases repeat prior SEC concerns, but some relate to new problems. Part IV
will conclude that a fiduciary rule for adviser accounts eventually will
likely be passed by either the SEC or another agency, but that such a rule
will not solve the conflict of interest problems facing investment managers,
and therefore increased SEC enforcement actions against advisers is
expected.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADVISERS ACT
A. PASSAGE OF THEADVISERSACT
The Advisers Act was a by-product of the five-part report that the SEC
provided to Congress between 1939 and 1941 entitled Investment Trusts
and Investment Companies.7 In conjunction with this five-part report, the
SEC also provided six supplemental reports to Congress, the second of
which is titled Investment Counsel, Investment Management, Investment
Supervisory and Investment Advisory Services (Investment Counsel
Report), highlighting the SEC’s concerns with the investment adviser
industry.8 The problems recognized were: distinguishing bona fide
investment counsel from tipsters; conflicts of interest; contingent
compensation tied to a percentage of profits; adviser custody of client assets
and capitalization of the adviser entity; and assignment of client
relationships.9 These findings prompted the introduction of identical bills in
the House of Representatives and the Senate that led to four weeks of
hearings with intense opposition from the investment adviser industry.10 In
particular, the industry resisted the negative characterization of abusive
practices by industry members, which were later stricken from the bill.11
The House Report stated that: “[t]he essential purpose of [the Advisers
Act] is to protect the public from the frauds and misrepresentations of
unscrupulous tipsters and touts and to safeguard the honest investment
7. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT
COMPANIES pts. I–IV (1939–l941); see also JAMES E. ANDERSON ET AL., INVESTMENT
ADVISERS: LAW&COMPLIANCE § 2.02 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed., 2015).
8. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT
COMPANIES, H.R. DOC. NO. 76-477 (2d Sess. 1939).
9. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 7, § 2.02.
10. See H.R. REP. NO. 76-2639 (1940); S. REP. NO. 76-1775 (1940).
11. See generally Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before a
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 76th Cong. (1940) [hereinafter Investment
Trusts and Investment Companies Hearings].
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adviser against the stigma of the activities of these individuals by making
fraudulent practices by investment advisers unlawful.”12 David Schenker,
the Chief Counsel of the SEC Investment Trust Study, described the
Advisers Act to Congress by stating:
[The Act] does not attempt to say who can be an investment counselor . . .
and does not even remotely presume to undertake to pass upon their
qualifications. All we say is that in order to get some idea of who is in the
business and what is his background, you cannot use the mails to perform
your investment counsel business unless you are registered with us.13
Many years ago, when I was an SEC enforcement attorney, I brought an
administrative proceeding to revoke the registration of a registered
investment adviser. In response, through an attorney, the adviser claimed he
could not file an answer to our complaint by reason of insanity. I was quite
flummoxed and asked whether this was not a sufficient ground upon which
to revoke his registration. I was told that the SEC does not pass on the
qualification of advisers. Even after many amendments to the Advisers Act,
this remains the case insofar as SEC registration is concerned. However,
many advisers pass the Series 65 exam administered by the Financial
Industry Regulatory Association (FINRA) on behalf of the North American
Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), and others may become
Certified Financial Planners or earn other designations from various
nongovernmental organizations.14
Initially, the Advisers Act did not do much more than require advisers
to register with the SEC, similar to the way Dodd-Frank now requires hedge
funds to register.15 The original legislation did not grant the SEC the power
to review or even to require that regulated advisers keep books and
records.16 Just five years into the Advisers Act’s existence, it became
readily apparent that the SEC needed more authority. The SEC was worried
that the end of World War II would initiate a new wave of retail
investment.17 In a release alongside its report to Congress, the SEC stated:
If the experience of World War I is any guide, many persons will be
solicited when this war ends to buy corporate securities with their excess
cash and with the proceeds of their matured or redeemed bonds.
Moreover, a marked increase in securities trading by uninformed and
12. H.R. REP. NO. 76-2639.
13. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies Hearings, supra note 11, at 50 (statement of
David Schencker, Chief Counsel, SEC Investment Trust Study).
14. See generally Series 65 – Uniform Investment Adviser Law Examination, FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/industry/series65 (last visited Mar. 23, 2016); Become a CFP Professional,
CFP BOARD, http://www.cfp.net/become-a-cfp-professional (last visited Mar. 23, 2016).
15. See 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279 (2015).
16. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–88b-21 (2012).
17. Investment Advisers Act Release No. 39, 1945 SEC LEXIS 917 (Jan. 31, 1945)
[hereinafter Release No. 39].
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inexperienced investors will probably occur. . . . [O]ur experience warns
us that some advisers may avail themselves of this opportunity for
exploitation of the gullible.18
Furthermore, the SEC’s fear of being inadequately equipped to combat
investment adviser fraud was increased by frauds similar in kind to that
committed by Robert J. Boltz of Philadelphia, who induced retail investors
to entrust him with $2.5 million by claiming to be a principal investor in a
highly profitable investment trust that did not actually exist.19 Boltz used
the funds for his personal investment in speculative securities and
commodities.20 Eventually, after running from the law, he was apprehended
and sentenced to twenty years in prison, the longest prison sentence handed
down under the Securities Act of 1933 at the time.21
B. 1960 AMENDMENTS
In 1945, the SEC presented Congress with a report detailing the
Advisers Act’s shortcomings, with proposals for amendments that would
enable the SEC to more effectively regulate the investment adviser
industry.22 Congress did not take action on the report for fifteen long years,
when it finally passed formal amendments to address the SEC’s concerns in
1960.23 The 1960 Amendments largely gave the SEC the power it sought in
the 1945 report; namely, the power to require advisers to keep accurate
books and records, and the power to inspect those records.24 The Senate
stated that the “prospect of an unannounced visit of a Government inspector
is an effective stimulus for honesty and bookkeeping veracity.”25
Additionally, the SEC could deny or suspend an adviser’s registration if he
or she violated any of the securities laws generally.26
Due to this Congressional expansion of the SEC’s power in 1960, the
SEC became empowered to use the Advisers Act’s antifraud provision in
section 206 to bring actions against advisers engaged in fraudulent
practices.27 In 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court decided SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., giving the SEC support for its efforts.28 In Capital
Gains, the Court differentiated common law fraud from fraud committed by
18. Id.
19. 1941 SEC ANN. REP. 7 pt. 8, at 217.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 217–18.
22. See Release No. 39, supra note 17.
23. See Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-750, 74 Stat. 885 (amending certain provisions
of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940).
24. See S. REP. NO. 86-1760, at 4 (1960).
25. See id. at 3.
26. See id. at 5.
27. See id. at 4 (discussing the new enforcement powers of the SEC); Investment Advisers Act
of 1940 § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012).
28. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194–95 (1963).
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investment advisers. The Court concluded that common law fraud was
borne out of arms-length commercial transactions.29 In contrast, it found
that the investment adviser relationship is one involving a preexisting
“affirmative duty of [the] ‘utmost good faith.’”30 This standard not only
involves an obligation to act in good faith, but also to disclose all material
facts and “‘to employ reasonable care to avoid misleading’ . . . clients.”31
Armed with the Capital Gains decision, the SEC set out to tackle three
problems that persisted in the investment adviser industry: “scalping,”
usurping client investment opportunities, and conflicts of interest.32
“Scalping” is a practice whereby investment advisers purchase thinly-
traded securities before issuing formal recommendation reports to clients,
who in turn purchase the recommended securities resulting in price
appreciation, allowing the investment advisers to cash out with substantial
gains.33 It is the exact practice at issue in the Capital Gains case.
Nevertheless, the practice was widespread in the industry at the time, and
the Capital Gains decision did not instantly eradicate it. The SEC pursued
other fraudsters using section 206, emboldened by the Supreme Court’s
imposition of a formal fiduciary duty.34
Between the 1960s and 1980s, the SEC became more forceful with its
use of section 206, not only to eradicate practices like scalping, but also to
eliminate any conduct it felt was inconsistent with the Capital Gains
fiduciary duty standard.35 This aggressive stance on section 206 was
highlighted when the SEC began to take a closer look at investment
advisers personally investing in securities that were appropriate for their
clients’ portfolios in the 1990s.36 For example, the SEC instituted an
enforcement action against Joan Conan in 1994, alleging that she personally
invested in securities that were well suited for the investment companies
she advised.37 Having been presented with a “conflict between her personal
gain and the financial interests of the [f]unds,” the SEC found that Conan
defrauded the investment companies by not disclosing the opportunity to
purchase the securities and failing to obtain the companies’ consent, either
prior to or following her purchase of the securities.38 The decision in Conan
29. See id.
30. Id. at 194 (quoting WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 535
(1955)).
31. Id. (quoting 1 HARPER& FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 541 (1956)).
32. See generally Barry P. Barbash & Jai Massari, The Investment Advisers Act of 1940:
Regulation by Accretion, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 627 (2008).
33. Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 181.
34. See, e.g., infra note 35.
35. See, e.g., Fred Alger Mgmt., Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 17,358,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1222, 45 SEC Docket 790, 791–92 (Feb. 26, 1990).
36. Barbash & Massari, supra note 32, at 634.
37. Conan, Exchange Act Release No. 34,756, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1446, 57
SEC Docket 1952, 1954 (Sept. 30, 1994).
38. Id.
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makes clear that the SEC views section 206 as creating a fiduciary standard
of conduct for registered advisers; a duty that imposes a disclosure
requirement that the adviser must inform the client if or when he or she is
“taking an investment opportunity appropriate for a client.”39 Conan also
appears to assert that advisers’ employees are also subject to this disclosure
requirement.40
Within a month of the Capital Gains case, the SEC used section 206 to
bring an enforcement action against a registered adviser for breaching its
fiduciary duty by providing partial investment advice to clients.41 The SEC
alleged that Chancellor Capital Management, and its principal, Parag
Saxena, recommended that clients invest in the securities of start-up
companies that were consulting clients and in which Mr. Saxena owned
numerous securities, especially stock options.42 Although Mr. Saxena had
received clearance from Chancellor Capital’s legal department to exercise
his stock options, the SEC found the Mr. Saxena’s fiduciary duty required
him to disclose his positions to the firm and its clients before exercising the
options.43 In bringing an enforcement action against both Chancellor
Capital and Mr. Saxena under section 206 of the Advisers Act, the SEC said
that Mr. Saxena’s ownership in the start-up companies created a conflict of
interest with the clients of Chancellor Capital.44 In recommending
investments in those companies on behalf of clients in contravention of
Chancellor Capital’s policies and without disclosing the conflict of interest
to clients, the SEC said that both Mr. Saxena and Chancellor Capital
violated their fiduciary duties and section 206.45 As a result of the section
206 violation, Mr. Saxena was forced to pay a fine of $250,000, and
Chancellor Capital was forced to pay a fine of $500,000.46
C. SUBSEQUENTAMENDMENTS—THE 1970S THROUGH 2002
During the period from 1970 to 2002, amendments to the Advisers Act
occasionally closed loopholes in SEC regulations, while also occasionally
opening new ones, reflecting the deregulatory philosophy of the time. The
1970 amendments to the Advisers Act were enacted in conjunction with
more extensive changes to the Investment Company Act of 1940.47 In 1969,
Senate Report 184 specified two purposes for these amendments. The first
39. Barbash & Massari, supra note 32, at 635.
40. Id.
41. Chancellor Capital Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1447, 57 SEC
Docket 2204, 2205 (Oct. 18, 1994).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2210.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Barbash & Massari, supra note 32, at 638 n.63.
47. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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was to close an exemption allowing some advisers to investment companies
to avoid registration.48 The second purpose was to strengthen disciplinary
controls over investment advisers.49 This was largely accomplished by
defining the term “person associated with an investment adviser” and
adding language to grant the SEC the authority to take disciplinary action
against these individuals.50
The 1970 amendments also gave the SEC authority to grant exemptions
from the various provisions of the Advisers Act, “if and to the extent such
exemption is . . . in the public interest and consistent with the protection of
investors and the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions of
[the Act].”51 The amendments granted advisers the ability to contract for
customized fee structures, such as fulcrum fees, with certain investment
companies and wealthy investors.52 Finally, the 1970 amendments imposed
liability on investment advisers for failure to supervise their employees and
other persons under their supervision with an objective of preventing
violations of the securities and financial laws.53 This requirement is
substantially identical to the provision imposing supervisory responsibility
on broker-dealers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.54
Further amendments in the 1980s and 1990s clarified various
provisions of the Advisers Act and adjusted its provisions to make them
compatible with amendments to other federal securities law statutes.55 An
amendment in 1996 divided the authority to register advisers between state
regulators and the SEC, and limited the states’ ability to require registration
of advisory personnel.56 It also permitted advisers to charge performance
fees to foreign clients and privately offered investment funds, granted the
SEC the authority to disqualify convicted felons, and provided for greater
investor access to disciplinary information about advisers and their
associated persons.57
In 1999, Congress enacted significant financial reform legislation in the
form of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB),58 which paved the way for
48. See S. REP. NO. 91-184, pt. J, at 44 (1969).
49. Id.
50. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(e)–(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)–(f) (2012).
51. Id. § 206A; see also S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 46.
52. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-2(c) (2015). In a fulcrum fee arrangement, the adviser’s fee
is determined based on the account’s performance as compared to an agreed-upon index.
53. See Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 23, 84 Stat.
1413, 1430 (amending section 202(a) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940).
54. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(4)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2012).
55. See Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 94 Stat. 2275
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
56. National Securities Markets Improvement Act § 303.
57. Id. § 310.
58. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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new affiliations between banks and securities firms, insurance companies,
and other members of the financial services industry. The GLB Act also
made changes to the Advisers Act. In particular, the GLB Act amended the
definition of “investment adviser” so that banks and bank holding
companies providing investment advisory services to investment companies
would be brought under the jurisdictional umbrella of the SEC and the
Advisers Act.59 This revision did not impact the Advisers Act exemption for
banks that provide investment advisory services to those entities that are not
investment companies. The GLB Act also included a novel privacy mandate
for all financial institutions.60
In 2000, Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act
(CFMA), thereby amending the Commodity Exchange Act.61 While the
statute did not affect investment advisers, it did add section 203(b)(6) to the
Advisers Act, providing that certain commodity trading advisers registered
with the Commodity Future Trading Commission (CFTC), whose
businesses do not primarily consist of acting as investment advisers, are
exempted from registering with the SEC under section 203(a) of the
Advisers Act.62 Shortly after passage of CFMA, a member of the SEC staff
noted that both the SEC and the CFTC would need to engage in
administrative rulemaking to establish criteria for determining whether an
adviser is “primarily” in the business of providing investment advice or
commodities trading advice.63 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-
Oxley)64 added section 203(e)(9),65 and corresponding revisions to section
203(f) of the Advisers Act.66 Section 203(e)(9) provides that bars or final
orders imposed by non-securities-financial regulators, including state and
federal banking regulators, and state insurance regulators are a potential
basis for adviser disqualification.
D. THEMUTUAL FUNDS SCANDALS OF THE EARLY 2000S
The most significant employment of section 206 arguably came in the
early 2000s as the SEC, in conjunction with separate actions taken by the
N.Y. Attorney General, sought to eradicate market timing investment in
59. See id. § 217(a) (amending section 202(a)(11)(A) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940).
60. See id. § 501.
61. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763,
2763A-365 to -480 (codified in scattered sections of 7 and 15 U.S.C.).
62. Id. § 209(b) (amending section 203(b)(6)(A) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940).
63. Paul Roye, Dir. of Div. of Inv. Mgmt., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address at
the Third Annual IA Compliance Summit: Managing the Revolution (Mar. 26, 2001).
64. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
65. Id. § 604(b); Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(e)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(9) (2012).
66. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 604(c)(2); Investment Advisers Act § 203(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(f).
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mutual funds, a practice that was rampant, particularly by hedge funds,
from the late 1990s to 2004.67
“[M]arket timing” refers to an investment strategy through which an
investor seeks to exploit arbitrage opportunities that arise from differences
created by market movements against the once-a-day pricing of mutual
funds shares. Most mutual funds registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 follow the business convention of determining the
price of their shares once a day, typically as of 4:00 p.m. Eastern time, the
close of trading on the New York Stock Exchange, through a calculation
based on the value of the fund’s holdings of securities. The securities or
other instruments held by a mutual fund, however, may be valued more
frequently than, or may trade at different times from, the mutual fund’s
shares. This valuation discrepancy was especially prevalent with regard to
after-hours trading in foreign markets. Because the identity of the holdings
of a mutual fund are not required to be, and are generally not, disclosed on
a real-time basis, an investor in the fund who receives specific information
about these holdings can engage in linked purchase and redemption
transactions in shares of the fund to take advantage of the differences in
the daily calculated price of the mutual fund’s shares and the market prices
of its holdings. The ability to engage rapidly in large purchase-and-
redemption transactions can enhance an investor’s potential returns.68
From 2003 to 2005, the SEC brought several enforcement actions
against funds engaged in this practice.69 In notable cases such as Alliance
Capital Management70 and Putnam Investment Management,71 the SEC
found that hedge funds giving preferred clients preferential arrangements
for market timing in exchange for investments violated section 206, even
though market timing is not explicitly illegal.72 In some cases, the funds
asserted they were not engaging in market timing, when in fact they were
doing so. Even if no representations about market timing were made, the
practice had an unsavory flavor.
In the case of Alliance Capital Management, the SEC found that
Alliance had arranged for over $600 million in market timing in 2003.73
One investor had singlehandedly peaked at $220 million of timing capacity
in certain Alliance mutual funds.74 In exchange, it invested in hedge funds
67. Barbash & Massari, supra note 32, at 646–47.
68. Id. at 645–46 (footnotes omitted).
69. Id.
70. Alliance Capital Mgmt., L.P., Investment Company Act Release No. 26,312, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2205, 81 SEC Docket 2800 (Dec. 18, 2003).
71. Putnam Inv. Mgmt., LLC, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,255, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2192, 81 SEC Docket 1913 (Nov. 13, 2003).
72. Barbash & Massari, supra note 32, at 647–49.
73. Alliance Capital Mgmt., L.P., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2205A, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,312A, 81 SEC Docket 3401 (Jan. 15, 2004).
74. Id.
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operated by the same portfolio managers overseeing the mutual funds.75
Alliance agreed to settle the case for $250 million without admitting or
denying the allegations against it.76
E. THE 2008 FINANCIALCRISIS AND THEDODD-FRANKACT
In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse and the Madoff Ponzi
scheme,77 there was a sense amongst regulators that the financial services
industry was due for a major overhaul. Congress enacted Dodd-Frank in
2010 in an attempt to bring about widespread changes to the industry.78
Right or wrong, the country placed much of the blame for the financial
collapse on the financial services industry for recommending institutional
and retail investment in worthless securities, particularly in mortgage-
backed securities. Dodd-Frank’s sweeping legislation contained provisions
amending the Advisers Act.79 Among other things, it expanded SEC
registration requirements to cover certain advisers and directed the SEC to
promulgate various rules under the Advisers Act.80
In 2011, the SEC formally adopted amendments to the Advisers Act
prompted by Dodd-Frank.81 The rules define key terms and provide
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Robert Lenzner, Bernie Madoff’s $50 Billion Ponzi Scheme, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2008, 6:45
PM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/12/madoff-ponzi-hedge-pf-ii-in_rl_1212croesus_inl.html.
78. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15
U.S.C.).
79. See generally id. tit. IV, 124 Stat. 1570; Rules Implementing Amendments to the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3110, 75 Fed. Reg.
77,052 (proposed Dec. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279); Exemptions for
Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers With Less Than $150 Million in Assets
Under Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3111, 75
Fed. Reg. 77,190 (proposed Dec. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275); Family Offices,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3220, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,983 (June 29, 2011) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 275); Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3221, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,950 (July 19, 2011) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279).
80. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 3110, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,052, 77,053 (proposed Dec. 10, 2010) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279); Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private
Fund Advisers With Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private
Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3111, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,190, 77,190 (proposed
Dec. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275); Family Offices, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 3220, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,983 (June 29, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275);
Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 3221, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,950, 42,951 (July 19, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 275, 279).
81. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 3110, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,052, 77,053 (proposed Dec. 10, 2010) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279); Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private
Fund Advisers With Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private
Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3111, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,190, 77,190 (proposed
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exemptions for investment advisers from registration.82 Namely, the rules
define “venture capital funds” for purposes of the exemption for venture
capital fund advisers;83 define key terms used in determining who is an
exempt “foreign private adviser”;84 change the reporting requirements for
both registered and unregistered investment advisers, including advisers to
hedge funds and other private funds;85 implement a new exemption for
advisers to private funds with less than $150 million in assets under
management;86 and define terms used in determining whether an adviser is
eligible for SEC or state registration.87
F. A REPORTCARD ON THE STATUTE
Before moving on to other topics, it seems appropriate to go back to the
purposes of the Advisers Act as articulated in the SEC’s Investment
Counsel Report and ask if the concerns expressed have been adequately
addressed.88 These concerns were:
Dec. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275); Family Offices, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 3220, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,983, 37,983 (June 29, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
275); Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 3221, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,950, 42,950 (July 19, 2011) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 275, 279).
82. See generally Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3110, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,052 (proposed Dec. 10, 2010) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279); Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private
Fund Advisers With Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private
Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3111, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,190 (proposed Dec. 10,
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275); Family Offices, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
3220, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,983 (June 29, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275); Rules
Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 3221, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,950 (July 19, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279).
83. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(l)-1 (2015).
84. Id. § 275.202(a)(30)-1.
85. Id. § 275.204(b)-1.
86. Id. § 275.203(m)-1.
87. Id. § 275.203A-1. See generally Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3110, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,052 (proposed
Dec. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279); Exemptions for Advisers to Venture
Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers With Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management,
and Foreign Private Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3111, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,190
(proposed Dec. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275); Family Offices, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 3220, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,983 (June 29, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 275); Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 3221, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,950 (July 19, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 275, 279).
88. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT
COMPANIES, H.R. DOC. NO. 76-477, at 27–30 (1939).
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1. Distinguishing Bona Fide Investment Counsel From
“Tipsters”
In general, a “tipster” is one who makes false or exaggerated statements
about an investment under a false pretense of offering genuine investment
advice.89 In contrast, a bona fide investment counselor is one who renders
personalized advice based on training and experience.90 One could certainly
argue that Madoff and other Ponzi scheme operatives of recent years were
scandalous “tipsters.”
2. Possible Difficulties With Conflicts of Interest
The Investment Counsel Report concluded that conflicts of interest
arise when a broker recommends a stock that he or she has personally
brought to market, or when a broker has a personal financial interest in a
given transaction.91 Corporate directorships held by investment counselors
were seen as another possible conflict of interest.92 Finally, the report
identified the conflict generated when counselors trade for their own
accounts’ securities.93
While the Advisers Act does not outlaw some of these specific
conflicts, and conflicts of interest must be described in the Form ADV and
delivered to clients, newer conflicts persist; for example, the sale of
proprietary products by advisers in a financial-services holding company. In
late 2015, the SEC sued First Eagle Investment Management, an asset
management firm, for improperly billing its investors $25 million in
payments to brokers marketing its mutual funds shares, instead of paying
the marketing costs itself.94 It made these payments pursuant to Rule 12b-1
of the Advisers Act. I feel a little guilty about that as I was a commissioner
in 1980 who favored adoption of this rule.95
3. Contingent Compensation Tied to a Percentage of Profits
The Investment Counsel Report noted that contingent fee structures
could incentivize investment advisers to take on unjustifiable risks that are
potentially inconsistent with the best interest of a client.96 An adviser faced
little to no downside risk, but would enjoy increased payment if her
89. See id. at 28.
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 29.
93. Id. at 29–30.
94. See Gretchen Morgenson, Dubious Marketing Fees Catch the Eye of the S.E.C., N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2015, at BU.1.
95. See generally Bearing of Distribution Expenses by Mutual Funds, Investment Company
Act Release No. 11,414, 45 Fed. Reg. 73,898 (Nov. 7, 1980) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239,
270, 274).
96. SeeMorgenson, supra note 94.
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speculation, or “churning,”97 paid off. Although the Advisers Act initially
outlawed contingent compensation, some contingent fees have crept into
the Advisers Act, and hedge fund managers and some other asset managers
not only charge contingent fees, but also fail to pay ordinary income taxes
on “carried interest.”98
4. Custody of Client Assets and Capitalization of the Adviser
Entity
The Investment Counsel Report discovered that many investment
advisers retained custody of client securities.99 Such arrangements were
viewed as being far too exposed to potential abuse. In addition, the question
of minimum capitalization requirements for adviser entities and the absence
of auditing requirements for investment advisers startled Congress.100 The
use of the corporate form to avoid personal liability amplified these
problems.101 It was only after the Madoff scandal that Congress tightened
the provisions of the Advisers Act to require that a Certified Public
Accountant (CPA) verify a client’s assets in an adviser’s custody,102
however, advisers are still not subject to any capital adequacy rules similar
to those imposed on other financial institutions.
5. Assignment of Client Relationships
The Investment Counsel Report noted that advisers established in the
corporate form could assign accounts, assets, and advisory services without
seeking the consent of the client, all by merely transferring ownership of the
adviser entity to third parties.103 Section 205 of the Advisers Act has now
prohibited such assignments without notification to clients.104
97. According to the SEC website:
Churning occurs when a broker engages in excessive buying and selling of securities in
a customer’s account chiefly to generate commissions that benefit the broker. For
churning to occur, the broker must exercise control over the investment decisions in the
customer’s account, such as through a formal written discretionary agreement. Frequent
in-and-out purchases and sales of securities that don’t appear necessary to fulfill the
customer’s investment goals may be evidence of churning.
Fast Answers: Churning, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/answers/churning.htm (last modified Jan. 15, 2013).
98. See Owen Davis, What is the Carried Interest Loophole?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 16,
2015, 1:53 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/what-carried-interest-tax-loophole-2100059.
99. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT
COMPANIES, H.R. DOC. NO. 76-477, at 30 (1939).
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(4) (2015).
103. H.R. DOC. NO. 76-477, at 30.
104. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 205(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(2) (2012); see also 17
C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(2).
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G. THECHANGED POPULATION OFADVISERS AND THEIRCLIENTS
When the Advisers Act passed in 1940, there were only fifty-one
advisory firms.105 There are currently 11,600 advisory firms registered with
the SEC.106 This figure does not include those entities that are exclusively
registered with the states.107 SEC-registered advisers manage more than $67
trillion of assets for more than fifteen million clients.108 SEC-registered
advisers reported in 2010 that approximately:
91.2% of their assets under management were in discretionary accounts,
while 8.8% were in non-discretionary accounts. Approximately 63.9% of
Commission-registered investment advisers reported that 51% or more of
their assets under management related to the accounts of individual clients
(other than high net worth individuals). Most investment advisers charge
clients fees for investment advisory services based on the percentage of
assets under management (over 95%). Others may charge hourly or fixed
rates. Few investment advisers reported receiving commission-based
compensation (8.9% of Commission-registered investment advisers). The
majority of [SEC-registered] investment advisers (51.2%) reported that
they have six or fewer non-clerical employees, and 91% reported that they
have 50 or fewer employees.109
One of the reasons for the explosion in the number of investment
advisory clients is the shift in retirement savings from defined-benefit
pension funds of large corporations to defined-contribution plans. “The
percentage of workers covered by a traditional defined-benefit pension plan
that pays a lifetime annuity . . . has been steadily declining over the past
twenty-five years.”110 From 1979 to 2011, the proportion of private wage
and salary workers participating in defined-benefit pension plans fell from
28 percent to 3 percent.111 By contrast, the proportion of private wage and
salary workers participating in only defined-contribution plans increased
from 7 percent to 31 percent.112 Even government entities are trying to
reduce the drag of pensions on their budgets by shifting employees into
defined-contribution plans. Thus, it can be anticipated that the growth of





109. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS
7 (2011) [hereinafter SECHARMONIZATION STUDY] (footnotes omitted).
110. Barbara A. Butrica et al., The Disappearing Defined Benefit Pension and Its Potential
Impact on the Retirement Incomes of Baby Boomers, SOC. SEC. BULL., Oct. 2009, at 1, 1.
111. FAQs About Benefits – Retirement Issues, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST.,
https://www.ebri.org/publications/benf
aq/index.cfm?fa=retfaq14 (last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (see Figure 1).
112. See id.
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investment funds under management by private advisers will continue to
grow.113
These statistics highlight the growth of the investment advisory
industry and provide a foundation for understanding the current
controversies concerning the DOL’s proposed fiduciary standard and the
SEC’s increasingly intense focus on the obligations of investment advisers.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF A FIDUCIARY STANDARD
A. DODD-FRANKMANDATES TO THE SEC
The issue of whether broker-dealers and investment advisers should be
subject to a harmonized fiduciary standard when giving personalized advice
to retail customers has been under consideration for years, at least since
broker-dealers moved from a commission-based fee structure to an asset-
based fee structure for brokerage customers after the unfixing of
commission rates in 1975.114 Dodd-Frank mandated that the SEC devote
renewed attention to the development of a harmonized fiduciary duty
regulation for investment advisers and broker-dealers, and gave the SEC the
authority to harmonize the fiduciary standard for brokers, dealers, and
investment advisers who provide personalized investment advice to
customers.115
The Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers (Harmonization
Study), released by the SEC staff in January 2011,116 was required by
Dodd-Frank to address whether there are regulatory gaps, shortcomings, or
overlaps in legal or regulatory standards for broker-dealers, investment
advisers, and their associated persons, whether imposed by the SEC, a
national securities association, or other state or federal authorities.117 Dodd-
Frank specified that the SEC incorporate fourteen items in the
Harmonization Study, including: whether retail customers understand the
difference between the standards of care applicable to broker-dealers and
investment advisers; the regulatory, examination, and enforcement
resources available to enforce standards of care; whether a change in the
standards would impact retail customers’ access to products and services;
the impact of eliminating the broker-dealer exclusion from the definition of
“investment adviser” in the Advisers Act; and the potential additional costs
113. See, e.g., PAULA SANFORD & JOSHUA M. FRANZEL, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PLANS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 6 (2012).
114. See Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 485, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
115. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 913(g), 124 Stat. 1376, 1828 (2010).
116. SEC HARMONIZATION STUDY, supra note 109.
117. Dodd-Frank Act § 913(b)(2) (mandating the Study and Rulemaking Regarding Obligations
of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment Advisers).
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to retail customers, broker-dealers, and advisers from changes in regulatory
requirements.118
One difficulty with harmonizing a fiduciary duty standard is that there
are many more investment advisers than broker-dealers, and some of the
adviser firms are quite small. In contrast to the more than 11,000 advisers
registered with the SEC, there are 5,100 broker-dealers registered with the
SEC, less than 1,000 of which claim “that they engage in, or expect to
engage in, investment advisory services.”119 Approximately 5 percent of
registered broker-dealers are now registered with the SEC as investment
advisers, and 22 percent of SEC-registered advisers reported having a
related person that was a broker-dealer; approximately 18 percent of broker-
dealer members of FINRA had an affiliate engaged in advisory services.120
Much of the Harmonization Study is devoted to a recitation of the
fiduciary duties applicable to investment advisers and the comparable duties
applicable to broker-dealers by way of the shingle theory.121 The SEC
staff’s analysis of retail investor perceptions and confusion regarding
financial service provider obligations and standard of conduct is based on
years of studies by the SEC and outside providers.122 The staff’s
unsurprising conclusion is that “retail customers do not understand and are
confused by the roles played by advisers and broker-dealers,” especially
when broker-dealers are “providing personalized investment advice and
recommendations about securities.”123 Accordingly, the staff recommended
that when personalized securities advice is given to retail customers,
advisers and broker-dealers should be subject to a uniform fiduciary
standard “that is no less stringent than currently applied to investment
advisers” under the antifraud provisions of the Advisers Act.124
In analyzing the regulation of broker-dealers and investment advisers,
the staff came up with a long list of gaps, shortcomings, and overlaps,
including “disclosure; registration; licensing; competency and continuing
education; obligation to act in the best interest of the customer; suitability;
oversight and examination; supervision; advertising; books and records;
[and] financial responsibility.”125 Also of importance were discrepancies in
investor remedies for fraud and other derelictions, and SRO membership
and regulation.126 The staff also pointed out that broker-dealer regulation
tends to be rule-based, in part because of SRO interpretations of the shingle
118. Id. § 913(c).
119. SEC HARMONIZATION STUDY, supra note 109, at 8.
120. Id. at 12.
121. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1271 (1995).
122. SEC HARMONIZATION STUDY, supra note 109, at 93–101.
123. Id. at 101.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 104–05 (footnotes omitted).
126. Id.
422 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 10
theory, whereas the fiduciary duty of advisers tends to be principles-
based.127 The Harmonization Study therefore recommended that the SEC
should engage in rulemaking to implement a harmonized standard for all
brokers, dealers, and investment advisers, when providing personalized
investment advice about securities to retail customers “to act in the best
interest of the customer without regard to the financial or other interest of
the broker, dealer, or investment adviser providing the advice.”128
One of the problems the SEC has faced in attempting to craft a uniform
fiduciary standard for advisers and broker-dealers is the principal trading
restrictions of section 206(3) of the Advisers Act.129 This provision prevents
an adviser from acting as principal in the sale of a security without
disclosing to a client in writing before the completion of the transaction the
capacity in which the adviser is acting and obtaining the client’s consent
before effecting the transaction.130 Although standards for dealing with
retail customers by broker-dealers are not that different in other respects
from the fiduciary duty standard of the Advisers Act, trade-by-trade
disclosure and consent to principal trading by broker-dealer customers is
unrealistic. If such consent had to be obtained, retail customers might be cut
off from opportunities to invest in underwritings and certain other products.
When confronted with having to impose such a duty on broker-dealers in
the past, the SEC passed a temporary rule allowing broker-dealers to obtain
blanket consent from customers in such situations, after making certain
disclosures to their clients and thereafter providing them with an annual
report of principal transactions.131 With regard to this thorny topic, the
Harmonization Study merely recommended that the SEC should give
guidance or engage in rulemaking to address “how broker-dealers [should]
fulfill the uniform fiduciary standard when engaging in principal
trading.”132
Another difference between broker-dealer and investment adviser
regulation is that there is no implied right of action for advisory clients
against advisers, although clients can sue for return of their fees.133 Broker-
dealers are subject to damages for fraudulent practices or recommendations,
but there are no express or implied provisions for liability in the Advisers
Act giving rise to damages when advisers make inappropriate
recommendations to clients.
At the time the Harmonization Study was issued, the SEC
Commissioners were not in agreement concerning a harmonized fiduciary
127. Id. at 103–04.
128. Id. at 109–10.
129. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (2012); see also 17
C.F.R. § 275.206(3) (2015).
130. See Investment Advisers Act § 206(3); 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(3).
131. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(3)-3T.
132. SEC HARMONIZATION STUDY, supra note 109, at 120.
133. Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979).
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standard. The two Republican Commissioners, Commissioners Casey and
Paredes, dissented from the release of the Harmonization Study on the
grounds that further studies needed to be completed to support its
conclusions.134 They expressed the view that the Harmonization Study
failed to adequately justify its recommendations and did not identify
whether retail investors were being harmed or disadvantaged by one
regulatory regime compared to the other.135 They also argued that the
Harmonization Study did not appropriately account for the cost of
implementing its recommendations.136 Commissioner Aguilar, a Democrat,
expressed the view that a uniform fiduciary standard might create a
hardship on smaller investment advisers.137 Given the lack of consensus at
the SEC with regard to these issues, against the backdrop of the SEC’s
budget problems, the staff recommendations stalled.
The current SEC Chair has stated that the SEC will implement a
harmonized fiduciary duty rule, but has given no timeline for any such
proposal.138 The DOL has now released a fiduciary duty rule for ERISA
accounts, including 401(k) and IRA accounts,139 and so even if the SEC
adopts a harmonized fiduciary duty rule, it probably will not be harmonized
with the DOL’s rule.
B. THEDEPARTMENT OF LABOR INITIATIVE
The DOL promulgates standards for any person deemed a “fiduciary”
with respect to a benefit plan and is thereby subject to the fiduciary duty
provisions of ERISA.140 These standards derive from trust law and require a
fiduciary to exercise a heightened degree of care, prudence, and diligence in
their discretionary authority or control over a benefit plan, its participants,
and beneficiaries.141 Specifically, the primary fiduciary obligations under
ERISA are: that plan assets be administered according to “the care, skill,
prudence and diligence . . . [of a] prudent man”;142 the obligation to act
134. Kathleen L. Casey & Troy A. Paredes, Comm’rs, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement




137. See Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Commissioner:
Setting Forth Aspirations for 2011 (Feb. 4, 2011).
138. See, e.g., Mark Schoeff Jr., SEC’s Mary Jo White Says Agency Will Develop Fiduciary
Rule for Brokers, INVESTMENTNEWS (Mar. 17, 2015, 12:31 PM), http://www.investmentnews.co
m/article/20150317/FREE/150319919/secs-mary-jo-white-says-agency-will-develop-fiduciary-
rule-for.
139. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment
Adviser, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,945 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550).
140. Id.; see also Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-406, § 404, 88 Stat. 829, 877–78 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012)).
141. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(3), 1002(7), 1002(8), 1002(21)(A)(i), 1104(a)(1) (2012).
142. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
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loyally, diversify plan investments, and follow plan documents;143 and to
refrain from various conflict-of-interest transactions.144 DOL rules affect a
large number of retirement plans and assets. Approximately $24.7 trillion
was invested in U.S. retirement-account assets as of the end of 2014.145
Over half that amount, $14.2 trillion, was invested in participant-directed
accounts, such as 401(k) plans and IRAs.146
In 2010, the DOL proposed a new regulation on the definition of a
fiduciary and the duties owed by such a person.147 In view of the protracted,
serious criticism of this proposal, the DOL promulgated a revised proposal
on April 20, 2015.148 The revised proposal also was subject to a variety of
serious criticisms, one of which is that the DOL is intruding on the SEC’s
turf in crafting a fiduciary duty rule.149 Analysis of the DOL proposal is
beyond the scope of this Article, but the controversy regarding the proposal
is pertinent to the SEC’s effort to promulgate a harmonized fiduciary
standard for investment advisers and broker-dealers, and some of the SEC’s
recent examination and enforcement programs.
The DOL asserts that its regulations require an adviser “to meet
fundamental obligations of fair dealing and fiduciary conduct—to give
advice that is in the customer’s best interest; avoid misleading statements;
receive no more than reasonable compensation; and comply with applicable
federal and state laws governing advice.”150 This principles-based
articulation of an adviser’s fiduciary duty does not appear to be especially
radical. Further, the DOL has created a “best interests contract exemption”
for broker-dealers who service IRAs.151 The Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), the trade association for the
securities industry, has proposed that FINRA adopt a best interest of the
customer standard in lieu of its existing suitability rule.152
The barrage of criticism of the DOL’s re-proposed fiduciary duty rule
was fierce. Congress has made several attempts to halt, or at least seriously
143. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A), (C), (D).
144. See id. § 1106.
145. INV. CO. INST., 2015 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND
ACTIVITIES IN THEU.S. INVESTMENTCOMPANY INDUSTRY 137 (2015).
146. See id.
147. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,263, 65,263 (proposed Oct. 22, 2010)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510).
148. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment
Advice, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,927, 21,928 (notice of proposed rulemaking and withdrawal of previous
proposed rule Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510).
149. See Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks by
Commissioner at: The SEC Speaks in 2015 (Feb. 20, 2015).
150. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment
Advice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,929.
151. Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,002 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 2550).
152. Press Release, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, SIFMA Proposes Best Interests Standard
for Broker-Dealers (June 3, 2015).
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delay, the issuance of a final rule.153 Among the concerns of the critics of
the DOL’s regulation are that it could possibly give IRAs a route to sue
advisers for faulty financial advice even though the DOL does not directly
regulate IRAs.154 Rather, IRAs are subject to the prohibited-transaction
rules of the Internal Revenue Code155 patterned on ERISA. The DOL
regulation also extends the type of activities in which a broker-dealer might
engage and therefore become a fiduciary, in particular giving advice with
regard to the investment of IRA rollovers.156
The most commonly reiterated complaint, however, is that there should
not be one set of DOL standards for ERISA, especially for IRAs, and
another set of standards for the accounts of other SEC-registered brokers
and advisers.157 Although most sectors of the financial services industry
have lined up in opposition of the DOL’s proposal, there are also some
significant lobbying groups, such as the Consumer Federation of America
(CFA) and AARP, supporting the proposed rule.158 This brouhaha has
occurred, at least in part, because the SEC has been unable to garner a
majority of commissioners to support a harmonized fiduciary standard for
broker-dealers and investment advisers. There is also an apparent struggle
between an executive-branch agency and the Obama-White House, and
opposing congressional interests influencing the SEC, or at least some of its
commissioners.
Although the DOL has now promulgated a fiduciary rule,159 it is quite
possible that the rule will be attacked by business groups in the courts and
perhaps upended by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.
C. THECREATION OF AN SRO FORADVISERS
Whether advisers should form an SRO is an issue of long standing in
securities regulation. The possibility of creating an SRO for investment
153. See, e.g., Mark Schoeff Jr., New Bills Aim to Stop DOL Fiduciary Rule, INVESTMENT
NEWS (Dec. 18, 2015, 1:59 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20151218/FREE/15121
9916/new-bills-aim-to-stop-dol-fiduciary-rule.
154. Commenters React to DOL’s Proposed Expansion of Fiduciary-Duty Rule, ROPES&GRAY
(Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.ropesgray.com/newsroom/alerts/2015/August/Commenters-React-
to-DOLs-Proposed-Expansion-of-Fiduciary-Duty-Rules.aspx [hereinafter Expansion of Fiduciary-
Duty Rule].
155. I.R.C. § 4975 (2012).
156. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET: DEPARTMENT OF LABOR PROPOSES RULE TO
ADDRESS CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN RETIREMENT ADVICE, SAVING MIDDLE-CLASS FAMILIES
BILLIONS OFDOLLARS EVERYYEAR 2 (2015).
157. See Expansion of Fiduciary-Duty Rule, supra note 154.
158. Memorandum from the Consumer Fed’n of America on the Dep’t of Labor Fiduciary Rule
Proposal to the Office of Regulations & Interpretations, Office of Exemption Determinations, and
Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor 1 (July 21, 2015).
159. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment
Adviser, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,945 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550).
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advisers was raised as a recommendation in the SEC’s 1963 Special Study
of the Securities Markets.160 In 1990, Congressmen Boucher, Dingell, and
Markey sponsored a bill called the Investment Advisers Disclosure and
Enforcement Act of 1990, which would have provided that advisers pay an
annual fee to the SEC to finance their own oversight.161 Then-
Commissioner Mary Schapiro (and later Chair of the SEC) gave testimony
on the proposed bill.162 She contrasted direct oversight by the SEC with a
system of self-regulation and stated that “direct regulation of advisers by
the [SEC] is in many respects preferable to creating another regulatory
system. However, the [SEC] cannot provide meaningful direct regulation of
advisers without significant additional resources.”163 In my opinion, this
remains true today.
A recommendation that an SRO be created for investment advisers was
again taken up in the Department of the Treasury Blueprint for a
Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure (Blueprint) published in March
2008.164 The Blueprint expressed the view that self-regulation of the
investment advisory industry, rather than SEC regulation, would increase
investor protection and be more cost-effective.165 The Treasury reasoned
that a “self-regulatory system can help to cover any gaps in federal
regulation and can typically respond to market developments more quickly
than can government oversight,” because government regulators are mainly
focused on antifraud enforcement, whereas SROs can adopt and amend
industry rules that address a wider range of activity and professional
conduct.166 Further, an SRO can result in significant savings to taxpayers.
An SRO’s “private source of funding . . . may even be more flexible than
that for governmental regulators, which typically depend upon Congress
and an annual appropriation process,” whereas an SRO can raise revenues
through fees paid by its members.167
The CFA expressed opposing views on the advisability of
implementing a self-regulatory system for investment advisers when Dodd-
160. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS,
H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, at 158–59 (1963).
161. H.R. 4441, 101st Cong. (1990).
162. Financial Services Industry: Hearings on H.R. 3054, H.R. 4441, and H.R. 5777 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 101st Cong. 276
(1990) (statement by Mary Schapiro, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).
163. Id. at 277.
164. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY
STRUCTURE 106 (2008).
165. Id. at 113.
166. Id. at 122.
167. Id. at 123. The Blueprint also acknowledged some downsides of SRO regulation, by
pointing out “the potential for redundant or duplicative regulatory burdens” and the conflict of
interest arising from the financial interest an SRO may have in its members or their business
activities. However, such potential problems can “be dealt with by structuring SROs as not-for-
profit entities and requiring that a majority of an SRO’s board members” are independent “and
that investor interests are well represented.” Id.
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Frank was wending its way through Congress.168 The CFA believed that
investment service providers should be regulated according to what they do
rather than what type of firm employs them.169 In that regard, the CFA
opposed designating FINRA as the SRO for investment advisers because
that “[would] mean that investors [would have to] . . . swim against a strong
tide of industry opposition in pushing reforms and that those reforms, when
adopted, [would] tend to be timid and incremental in nature.”170 Instead, the
CFA endorsed the governance model of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) in order to ensure the independence of the
contemplated SRO and the predominance of investor interests in the
reforms adopted.171
By contrast, the Investment Adviser Association (IAA) opposed the
creation of an SRO for the advisory profession, arguing that the SEC is an
appropriate direct regulator of investment advisers.172 The IAA indicated
the following drawbacks to an SRO: inherent conflicts of interest; questions
about transparency, accountability, and oversight; and added costs and
bureaucracy.173 The IAA particularly opposed the idea of FINRA as the
SRO for investment advisers, given its governance structure, costs, track
record, and advocacy of the broker-dealer model of regulation, reasoning
that any harmonization of fiduciary standards should not result in subjecting
investment advisers to inappropriate broker-dealer rules.174 Instead of
focusing on an SRO as the response to proper oversight of investment
advisers, the IAA believed that Congress should provide additional
resources to the SEC to oversee advisers.175
The IAA was concerned that establishing FINRA as the SRO for
investment advisers would result in a complete overhaul of investor
protections set forth in the Advisers Act, including fiduciary duty,
requirements to disclose conflicts of interest, and restrictions on principal
trading. The diversity of the investment adviser industry would make a
rules-based SRO model, such as FINRA’s broker-dealer rules, unworkable.
The IAA argued that the adviser community includes traditional asset-
management firms, financial planners, wealth managers, advisers that are
part of global financial institutions, and small advisers, and there is not
sufficient commonality among the various types of adviser business
168. See Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities Markets—Part II:
Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 196 (2009)
(prepared statement of Barbara Roper, Dir. of Inv’r Prot., Consumer Fed’n of America).
169. Id. at 205.
170. Id. at 206.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 225 (prepared statement of David G. Tittsworth, Exec. Dir. & Exec. Vice President,
Inv. Adviser Ass’n).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 225–26.
175. Id. at 226.
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models.176 In addition, the IAA asserted that the drawback of industry-
funded regulation is that most investment advisory firms are small
businesses with limited resources, and the costs of any SRO would impact
all investment advisers, including thousands of these small advisory firms,
with the ultimate costs passed on to investors.177
FINRA testified that it was uniquely positioned from a regulatory
standpoint to build an oversight program for investment advisers quickly
and efficiently.178 “In FINRA’s view, the best oversight system for
investment advisers would be one that is tailored to fit their services and
role in the market, starting with the requirements that are currently in place
for advisory activity.”179 Differences in investor-protection standards for
broker-dealers and investment advisers could be further dealt with by
increased consistency in investor protections across financial services
because “investors deserve a consistent level of protection no matter which
financial professionals or products they choose.”180
Faced with these strongly expressed opposing views, Congress punted.
Instead of settling these differences, Dodd-Frank mandated two related
studies by the SEC regarding investment advisers, the Examinations
Study181 and the Harmonization Study.182 The Examinations Study was
required to address “the need for enhanced examination and enforcement
resources for [the oversight of] investment advisers.”183 This study
demonstrated that the SEC seriously lacked the resources for the
examination of SEC-registered advisers. The other study, the
Harmonization Study discussed above, involved the broker-dealer exclusion
to the definition of investment adviser; and the “effectiveness of existing
legal or regulatory standards of care” for brokers, dealers, and investment
advisers when providing personalized investment advice to retail customers,
discussed above.184 Dodd-Frank also required the Comptroller General to
conduct a study on the feasibility of creating an SRO for advisers.185
Over the years, the SEC and the securities industry have experimented
with a variety of different types of SROs, which are subject to considerable
176. Id. at 220.
177. Id. at 225.
178. See id. at 53 (statement of Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman & CEO, Fin. Indus. Regulatory
Auth.).
179. Id. at 55.
180. Id. at 166 (prepared statement of Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman & CEO, Fin. Indus.
Regulatory Auth.).
181. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 914, 124 Stat. 1376, 1830 (2010) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11 note (2012))
(mandating the Study on Enhancing Investment Adviser Examinations).
182. Id. § 913.
183. Id. § 914(a)(1); DIV. OF INV. MGMT., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON ENHANCING
INVESTMENTADVISER EXAMINATIONS 1 (2011) [hereinafter SEC EXAMINATIONS STUDY].
184. SEC HARMONIZATION STUDY, supra note 109, at i.
185. Dodd-Frank Act § 939E.
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SEC oversight, including FINRA.186 For better or worse, self-regulation is
embedded in the framework of federal securities regulation, and it has long
been used to leverage the SEC’s scarce resources, especially with regard to
examinations of securities industry participants. Unless Congress becomes
willing to vastly increase the SEC’s budget, or give the agency the authority
to become a self-funded organization, the only realistic way to provide for
the appropriate examination of advisers is to give this job to FINRA or to a
new SRO.
Whether the best SRO for advisers is FINRA, a separate subsidiary of
FINRA, or a newly organized and separate SRO is a difficult question.
There are numerous reasons why it would be easier to put an SRO for
advisers under FINRA’s umbrella. FINRA already has a well-understood
legal relationship to the SEC and it has the necessary infrastructure for the
job. On the other hand, an SRO does depend on industry input and
governance, and if the majority of advisers wish to establish a separate
SRO, they should probably do so. There is nothing to prevent such a
development other than resistance on the part of advisers to any SRO
regulation.
I do not agree that the PCAOB is a good model for advisers because its
board members are SEC-appointed and it is essentially a government
agency, not an SRO.187 Neither do I agree that a harmonized fiduciary
standard would necessarily have to be rule-based. A rule-based regime is
what the DOL has now crafted, and the industry is extremely unhappy with
this development. Perhaps now that the industry is confronted both with the
DOL’s ideas about the fiduciary obligations of advisers and the SEC’s
apparent inability to either halt or alter the DOL’s proposal, the prospect of
an SRO for advisers will seem more appealing.
III. SEC EXAMINATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT CASES
A. EXAMINATIONS BY THEOFFICE OFCOMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS
AND EXAMINATIONS
The SEC has long been lacking an adequately financed and effective
examinations program for investment advisers. In the early 1990s, the SEC
urged Congress to pass legislation imposing an annual fee on advisers based
on the amount of assets under management in order to fund a greatly
increased inspection cycle for small investment advisers.188 Proposed
legislation to this effect sparked a debate over the creation of a private right
of action under the antifraud provisions of the Advisers Act, which the
186. See Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be
Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151, 151 (2008).
187. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484–85 (2010).
188. S. 2266, 102nd Cong. § 5 (1992); H.R. 5726, 102nd Cong. § 4 (1992).
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chairman of the SEC opposed.189 Thus, this legislation never came to
fruition. Dodd-Frank did not solve the problem of an underfunded SEC unit
for examinations, but rather mandated another study in an attempt to fill this
legislative void.
Dodd-Frank not only mandated the Examinations Study by the SEC on
the need for enhanced examination and enforcement resources for
investment advisers, but also set forth certain parameters for it.190 The SEC
was required to examine: first, “the number and frequency of examinations
of investment advisers over the [five] years preceding the date of the
enactment of [Dodd-Frank]”; second, the extent to which the designation of
one or more SROs to augment the SEC’s efforts would improve the
frequency of examinations; and third, “current and potential approaches to
examining the investment advisory activities of dually registered broker-
dealers and investment advisers.”191 Also, the SEC was supposed to discuss
“the regulatory or legislative steps . . . recommended or . . . necessary to
address the concerns in the Study.”192
The Examinations Study discussed the work of the Office of
Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) with regard to
examinations of registered investment advisers over the six years prior to
the release of the study. OCIE takes a risk-based approach to the
examination process, identifying higher-risk advisers based on information
in regulatory filings, assessments during past examinations, and other
criteria such as tips. OCIE conducts three types of examinations: (1) high
risk examinations; (2) cause examinations; and (3) special purpose
reviews.193 Routine examinations seem not to be part of OCIE’s work. The
focus of OCIE’s examinations is to “(1) improve compliance; (2) prevent
fraud; (3) monitor risk; and (4) inform regulatory policy.”194
The Examinations Study reviewed OCIE’s record of adviser
examinations, and the results were shocking. The number of registered
advisers had increased over the past six years and the number of OCIE staff
had decreased.195 Further, the assets of registered investment advisers had
increased, correlating to the size and complexity of the operations of the
advisers examined.196 The results “would have been even more significant
but for the increase in . . . OCIE staff between 2008 and 2010.”197
189. See S. 2266, § 5; H.R. 5726, § 4; Advisers Act Proposal Shouldn’t Include Private Suit
Provision, Breeden Declares, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 831 (June 12, 1992).
190. Dodd-Frank Act § 914(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11 note (mandating the Study on Enhancing
Investment Adviser Examinations).
191. Id.
192. SEC EXAMINATIONS STUDY, supra note 183, at 1.
193. Id. at 5.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 8.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 10.
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Nevertheless, in 2010, OCIE examined only 9 percent of registered
advisers, putting the rate of examination for advisers at once every eleven
years.198 By contrast, FINRA examined 57 percent of its members in 2008,
and 54 percent in 2009.199
The SEC has made a valiant effort to improve its examinations of
investment advisers, but there are more than 10,000 investment advisers
registered with the SEC and there are only about 450 examiners,
accountants, and lawyers, spread throughout the twelve SEC offices, who
are dedicated to the examination of investment advisers and investment
companies for compliance with the securities laws.200 One idea for dealing
with this mismatch of SEC resources to the number of advisers requiring
examinations is third-party audits of advisers.201
In 2014, OCIE focused on newly registered advisers such as private
funds.202 OCIE’s examination priorities for 2015 focused on “examining
matters of importance to retail investors and investors saving for
retirement.”203 In June 2015, OCIE launched a multi-year Retirement-
Targeted Industry Reviews and Examinations Initiative (ReTIRE).204 Risk-
based examinations conducted pursuant to this initiative will focus on:
reasonable basis for investment advice and recommendations; conflicts of
interest; supervision and compliance controls; and marketing and
disclosure.205 “As part of its examination sweep, the SEC is sending to
financial advisers a 13-page information request” that focuses on adviser
recommendations to roll over funds from a 401(k) to an IRA, fees charged,
conflicts of interest, and supervisions and compliance controls.206
According to Jason Roberts, Chief Executive of the Pension Resource
Institute, the SEC’s initiatives are part of a regulatory turf war. “You can
certainly see that they’re trying to step up their oversight of this area and
198. Id.
199. Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Enhancing
Investment Adviser Examinations (Required by Section 914 of Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act) (Jan. 19, 2011).
200. About Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations: National Exam Program:
Offices and Program Areas, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/ocie?Article/about
.html (last modified Mar. 4, 2014).
201. See Third-Party Advisor Audits Could Be a Disaster: Norm Champ, THINKADVISOR (Nov.
24, 2015), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2015/11/24/third-party-advisor-audits-could-be-a-disaste
r-nor.
202. Marc J. Fagel & Leslie A. Wulff, Private Funds: Preparing for Another Year in the SEC
Crosshairs, 48 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 13 (2015).
203. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
EXAMINATION PRIORITIES FOR 2015 1 (2015).
204. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
RISK ALERT: RETIREMENT-TARGETED INDUSTRY REVIEWS AND EXAMINATIONS INITIATIVE 1
(2015).
205. Id. at 2–3.
206. Mark Schoeff Jr., SEC Exam Questions Dive Deeply into Retirement-Account Advice,
INVESTMENTNEWS (Dec. 22, 2015, 1:56 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20151222/
FREE/151229968/sec-exam-questions-dive-deeply-into-retirement-account-advice.
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say that they have a handle on regulating it, and that it is not the vacuum
that DOL has portrayed.”207
B. ENFORCEMENTCASES
This stepped up focus on compliance by investment advisers also has
resulted in a record number of enforcement cases.208 “The Division of
Enforcement’s Asset Management Unit has 75 professionals spread across
all 12 SEC offices” and works closely with OCIE.209 The 2014 OCIE
program targeting new adviser registrants resulted in a fair number of
enforcement actions on such issues as “expense allocation and undisclosed
fees, asset valuation and misleading marketing materials.”210
Among the enforcement cases the SEC instituted in 2014 were the
following:
Lincolnshire Management: The SEC charged an “investment advisory
firm with breaching its fiduciary duty to a pair of private equity funds by
sharing expenses . . . in a manner that improperly benefited one fund over
the other.”211 The two portfolio companies, which were acquired at different
times, integrated a number of business and operations functions (i.e., human
resources, marketing, and technology) and shared expenses that were
generally allocated based on each company’s contributions to their
combined revenue.212 The SEC found, however, that in some cases, a
portion of the shared expenses were misallocated or undocumented—for
example, one portfolio paid the entire third-party payroll and 401(k)
administrative expenses for the employees of both companies and some
employees performed work that benefitted both companies, but their
salaries were not allocated between the two.213 As part of the settlement, the
firm agreed to pay $1.5 million in disgorgement, a $450,000 penalty, and
$358,112 in prejudgment interest.214
Transamerica Financial Advisors: The SEC charged an investment
adviser with failing to pass on appropriate breakpoint discounts to clients
when they increased their client’s assets in certain investment programs and
207. Id.
208. SEC’s FY 2014 Enforcement Actions Span Securities Industry and Include First-Ever
Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/De
tail/PressRelease/1370543184660.
209. Jon Eisenberg, SEC Enforcement Actions Against Investment Advisers, K&L GATES 1
(Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/4edea1a0-a6fc-42d8-8006-03a3e030ba8
c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/069ba046-0e19-4d2f-b3de-071c9f5df68e/GovEnforcement
_Alert_10212015.pdf.
210. Fagel & Wolff, supra note 202, at 4.
211. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges New York-Based Private Equity
Fund Adviser With Misallocation of Portfolio Company Expenses (Sept. 22, 2014).
212. Lincolnshire Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3927, 2014 WL 4678600,
at *3–4 (Sept. 22, 2014).
213. Id. at *4–5.
214. Id. at *6.
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also failed in some cases to aggregate related client accounts eligible for
discounts.215 The SEC stated that its examination staff had flagged the issue
in an examination, in which the adviser had taken steps to address the
aggregation issue after that examination, but that a subsequent examination
revealed that the aggregation problem still existed, which led to the
enforcement action.216 The SEC charged that the “failures occurred because
of inadequate policies and procedures at [the adviser’s] headquarters to
implement the breakpoint policy, [in particular], the firm’s policies and
procedures did not clearly delineate who was responsible for reviewing new
account forms for account aggregation purposes,” and as a result, the firm
“failed in certain instances to appropriately link accounts together to apply
breakpoints in the billing process.”217 The SEC also alleged that the adviser
maintained two separate policy and procedure manuals, and that they
“contained conflicting policies on the application of advisory fee
breakpoints”—one making the breakpoint discounts mandatory and the
other making them discretionary.218 In connection with the action, the firm
reviewed client records and paid reimbursement of $553,624; as part of the
settlement, it also paid an additional $553,624 penalty.219
Clean Energy Capital LLC: The SEC brought charges against a private
equity manager who used assets from nineteen private equity funds to pay
more than $3 million of expenses that the manager should have borne.220
This was in addition to the management fees already being paid to the
manager. The SEC charged that the manager failed to disclose the payment
arrangement in fund offering documents, and stated that “[p]rivate equity
advisers can only charge expenses to their funds when they clearly spell . . .
out [those arrangements] for investors.”221 The SEC also charged a number
of other violations, including that the manager caused the funds to borrow
money from the manager at unfavorable rates.222
After 2014, SEC enforcement actions against advisers became even
more widespread. “In the first 10 months of 2015, [the SEC] brought over
215. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Transamerica Financial Advisors
With Improperly Calculating Advisory Fees and Overcharging Clients (Apr. 3, 2014).
216. Transamerica Fin. Advisors, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 71,850, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 3803, 2014 WL 1320270, at *3 (Apr. 3, 2014).
217. Id. at *4.
218. Id. at *5.
219. Id.
220. Clean Energy Capital, Securities Act Release No. 9551, Exchange Act Release No. 71,610,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3785, Investment Company Act Release No. 30,926, 2014
WL 709469, at *1–2 (Feb. 25, 2014); see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC
Announces Charges Against Arizona-Based Private Equity Fund Manager in Expense
Misallocation Scheme (Feb. 25, 2014).
221. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Charges Against Arizona-
Based Private Equity Fund Manager in Expense Misallocation Scheme (Feb. 25, 2014) (quoting
Marshall S. Sprung, Co-Chief, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Enf’t Div., Asset Mgmt. Unit).
222. Clean Energy Capital, 2014 WL 709469, at *1.
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two dozen significant cases” against advisers.223 These cases embraced a
wide variety of issues. Undisclosed fees, use of fund assets to pay expenses,
and undisclosed conflicts of interest were high on the list of wrongful
conduct.224 The SEC also brought cases with regard to improper valuations
of illiquid assets and misrepresentations about fund performance and
investment risk.225 Among the enforcement cases the SEC instituted in 2015
were the following:
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.: The SEC charged a private equity
adviser with a breach of fiduciary duty by misallocating more than $17
million “broken deal” expenses to its flagship private equity funds.226 In
addition, it also charged the adviser with failure to adopt policies and
procedures governing expense allocation practices.227 The adviser settled
this case, agreeing to pay more than $14 million in disgorgement and a $10-
million penalty.228 The adviser consented to the entry of a finding of
violations of sections 206(2), 206(4), and Rule 206(4)-7 of the Advisers
Act.229
First Eagle Investment Management and FEF Distributors: Pursuant to
the SEC’s “Distribution-in-Guise” initiative, the SEC brought a case against
an investment adviser for the improper use of fund assets to pay for
distribution-related services.230 The SEC alleged that FEF Distributors
(FEF) entered into agreements with two financial intermediaries for their
distribution and marketing services, making payments in addition to those
required pursuant to a 12b-1 plan.231 The SEC also alleged that FEF
inaccurately reported that these expenses were for sub-transfer agency
payments.232 In a settled administrative proceeding, the respondents agreed
to pay disgorgement of $24,907,354 plus pre-judgment interest and a
penalty of $12.5 million, and to findings of violations of section 206(b) of
the Advisers Act and provisions of the Investment Company Act.233
Virtus Investment Advisers, Inc.: The SEC instituted and settled
proceedings against an adviser based on the inclusion in advertisements and
223. Eisenberg, supra note 209, at 1.
224. Id. at 1–2.
225. Id. at 2; see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Enforcement
Results For FY 2015: Results Include Significant Number of High-Impact and First-of-their-Kind
Actions (Oct. 22, 2015).
226. Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4131, 2015
WL 3941621, at *1 (June 29, 2015).
227. See id. at *6.
228. Id. at *7–8.
229. Id. at *6, *8.
230. First Eagle Inv. Mgmt., LLC, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,832, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 4199, 2015 WL 5528211 (Sept. 21, 2015).
231. Id. at *3.
232. Id. at *4.
233. Id. at *8; see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Investment
Adviser With Improperly Using Mutual Fund Assets to Pay Distribution Fees (Sept. 21. 2015).
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filings of false and misleading performance data.234 The data had been
prepared by a third party, but the SEC held that the adviser was ultimately
responsible for verifying its accuracy.235
CONCLUSION
Conflicts of interest are common in every fiduciary relationship in the
financial services industry. Such conflicts are “material facts that
investment advisers . . . must disclose to their clients.”236 Informed consent
from the client permits the adviser to continue the advisory relationship
despite the conflict, but the “adviser’s failure to disclose conflicts of interest
to clients subjects it to possible enforcement action.”237
A recent article summarized the different investment adviser conflicts
as: investment adviser firm v. client; client v. client; employee v. client;
employee v. investment adviser firm; and vendor v. client.238 While some of
these conflicts can be cured by full disclosure and client consent, others
may be more difficult to manage or eradicate. Further, the DOL is
concerned about some newer conflict areas, such as IRA rollovers, and the
promulgation of its fiduciary duty rule may well impose new and more
rigorous obligations on advisers. Also, it is unclear whether FINRA’s rules
and standards meet some of the more rigorous ERISA standards, such as the
requirement to continuously monitor a client’s investments.239 Therefore, it
is not surprising that the SEC has had such difficulty in fashioning a
harmonized fiduciary duty standard for advisers and broker-dealers.
In the meantime, while the SEC and DOL work on harmonizing
fiduciary duty rules, SEC examinations and enforcement will likely focus
on investment adviser conflicts. OCIE announced that one of its top
priorities for 2016 is protecting retail retirement assets.240 It can be
anticipated that one by-product of OCIE’s 2016 examinations of investment
advisers will be enforcement actions. SEC Chair Mary Jo White focused on
investment management as a key area of misconduct for enforcement in her
234. Virtus Inv. Advisers, Inc., Investment Company Act Release 31,901, Investment Advisers
Release No. 4266, 2015 WL 7179719 (Nov. 16, 2015).
235. Id. at *2.
236. Julie M. Riewe, Co-Chief of the Asset Mgmt. Unit in the Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Conflicts, Conflicts Everywhere—Remarks to the IA Watch 17th Annual IA
Compliance Conference: The Full 360 View (Feb. 26, 2015).
237. See id.
238. Joshua Horn & Amit Shah, Guidance on Conflicts of Interest for Investment Advisers,
PRAC. COMPLIANCE&RISKMGMT. FOR SEC. INDUSTRY, Jan.–Feb. 2015, at 21, 23–25.
239. See Tibble v. Edison Int’l, No. 13-550, slip op. at 6 (U.S. May 18, 2015) (ERISA fiduciary
has continuing duty to monitor investments and remove imprudent ones).
240. “OCIE will continue several 2015 initiatives to assess risks to retail investors seeking
information, advice, products, and services to help them plan for and live in retirement.” Press
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces 2016 Examination Priorities: New Areas of
Focus Include Liquidity Controls, Public Pension Advisers, Product Promotion, Exchange-Traded
Funds and Variable Annuities (Jan. 11, 2016).
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testimony to the House Committee on Financial Services in November
2015.241 She stated that “the SEC has continued to bring actions addressing
a wide range of issues, such as performance advertising, undisclosed
conflicts of interest, compliance issues, and private equity fees and
expenses.”242 The implication of these remarks is that SEC policies on
investment-adviser conflicts of interest will be developed through
enforcement cases.
It therefore appears that the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Advisers
Act is being celebrated by renewed emphasis on the law’s fiduciary duty
provisions for the protection of retail and other investors through
rulemaking by the DOL and SEC, as well as SEC enforcement cases. A
basic problem with the regulation of the fiduciary duties of advisers is that
advisers charge for their services, and they are not going to provide advice
for free. This is the inherent conflict of interest that advisers have with their
clients, and although it can be ameliorated by regulation, neither the SEC
nor the DOL has the competence to determine what advice is in the best
interest of the clients. The SEC has traditionally focused on fees charged by
advisers, but suitability and skill at investment analysis is at least as
important as low fees. As argued above, an SRO, rather than a government
agency, is better suited to regulate these matters.
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the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n).
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